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Abstract
We describe the background and the basic funding mechanisms for the type of adjustable rate mortgage
loans that were introduced in the Danish market in 1996. Each loan is funded separately by tap issuing
pass-through mortgage bonds (“strict balance principle”). The novelty is a funding mechanism that uses
a roll-over strategy, where long term loans are funded by sequentially issuing short term pass-through
bonds, and the first issuer of these loans obtained a patent on the funding principles in 1999. Publicly
available descriptions of the principles leave an impression of very complicated numerical algorithms.
The algorithms described here show that the essentials can be reduced to a “back of an envelope” com-
plexity.
Keywords: Adjustable rate mortgages, balance principle, patent, yield curve riding
1 Background and motivation
The Danish market for mortgage loans adopted the funding idea of mortgage backed securities more
than two hundred years ago. The first credit institution of this kind developed in 1797 after a big fire
in Copenhagen in 1795 and the financing needs following this event. In 1850 the first specific law
concerning mortgage credit institutions was inaugurated, writing into law and government regulation the
structure under which these institutions have functioned since then. Although institutional changes have
naturally taken place the core of this part of the financial system has remained quite stable for the entire
period.
Although considerable care must be exercised in international comparisons of markets w.r.t. such mea-
sures as size and liquidity, the Danish market for bonds and, in particular, mortgage bonds is the largest in
the world relative to GDP as well as population size. Roughly 2/3 of the outstanding volume of bonds are
issued by mortgage credit institutions and the remaining part is almost exclusively government bonds.
Corporate bonds account for only a tiny part of the market. For more recent surveys on the Danish
market structure, including market statistics, see e.g. Christiansen et al. (2003), Frankel et al. (2004),
Moody (2002) and Realkreditrådet (1998).1
Mortgage loans are funded by pooled issues of bonds. The most important characteristics, some of them
distinguishing the Danish market from similar markets in other countries, are:
1. The strict balance principle. Mortgage credit institutions are only allowed to carry funding risk to
a negligible extent. The payments from the debtors must match the payments to the bondholders.
Credit institutions charge debtors transaction costs besides a directly specified “contribution”, equiv-
alent to an interest rate margin. Both are at a low and very competitive level in comparison with other
sources of debt financing. For the average homeowner the borrowing rate differs from the funding
rate by a spread of approximately 50bp.
The credit institutions carry the default risk of debtors, and the bondholders are only in very extreme
situations2 subject to any credit risk. The contribution can partly be interpreted as debtor’s payment
of an insurance premium for the credit institution’s obligation to cover losses from debtor defaults
from their equity reserves.
2. Traditionally, this balance principle has been implemented by issuing bonds as mirror images of the
loans. I.e. a 20 or 30 year annuity loan has been funded by issuing an equivalent amount of 20 or 30
year annuity bonds.
1The latter two available from the English language homepage of The Association of Danish Mortgage Banks,
http://www.realkreditraadet.dk.
2For all practical considerations Danish mortgage bonds are risk free and top-rated investment objects.
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3. Long term mortgage bonds are – with few exceptions – callable at par. This embedded option is an
American style call option, exercisable at each of four annual payment dates, but advance notice is
required in order to exercise the option. The only major exception to this has been the market for CPI-
indexed mortgage bonds, which is not treated here and which has been used mainly by subsidized
building societies and hardly by individual homeowners at all.
4. The delivery option on behalf of debtors. Due to the balance principle debtors can only prepay their
loan by delivering an equivalent amount of bonds of that particular type which was originally issued
in order to finance their loan. The bonds to deliver must be bought in the open market or through
exercise of the call option at par. Due to transaction costs and certain tax asymmetries callable bonds
can have market prices above par, typically in the range of 2− 5%.
5. Before each payment date bondholders are notified of the entire amount of repayment in the pool −
consisting of both regular repayments and prepayments. For the majority of the bonds with quarterly
payments this notification is roughly made in the middle of each quarter. Bonds traded after the
notification date only receive interest payment at the first payment date. The owner of the bond at the
notification date receives repayments on a pro rata basis3.
6. Bonds are tap issued in pools of bonds with identical characteristics (coupon rate, maturity, payment
profile etc.). The pools are usually kept open for tap issue in an opening period of three years. After
this opening period, the bonds in a particular pool are perfect substitutes.
7. Mortgage loans are – as the point of departure – assumable in case of turnover of the house. Mortgage
loans are in a literal sense “real estate finance” related more to the house than to the individual.
The regulation of this market has been extensively used as a macroeconomic policy tool in order to
influence aggregate demand through credit market policy in the period starting in the mid 1960’es. It has
been regulated by law to what extent such loans may be granted and what type of loans, in particular w.r.t.
maturity and amortization schedule, are allowed. The possibility of taking up supplementary mortgage
loans has been subject to tight control and only allowed for certain purposes and within narrow limits
and for shorter maturities. A gradual deregulation and liberalization of capital flows took place during
the 1980’es, but until the de facto liberalization in 1993 it was deliberately made difficult to obtain any
supplementary financing through mortgage credit institutions as long as this was not related to a turnover
of the house.4 Being a macroeconomic policy tool these restrictions have been varying over time with
the conduct of macroeconomic policy.
3As of year 2001 this constituted a change of procedure. Repayments used to be distributed to bondholders due to a
randomized selection procedure.
4And even in this case it was difficult until 1982. An example of a different kind of credit market policy was used in 1998,
where the usual 0.3% government fee for mortgage loans was raised temporarily to 5% for loans not related to a turnover.
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Given this climate of tight and changing regulation debtors have persistently perceived of mortgage
financing as a rationed good, taking the political risk of future restrictions into account. Debtors have
taken out the maximal amount of mortgage loans with as long a maturity as possible and as slow an
repayment profile as possible, at least in the case of a turnover. Different variants of loans have been
allowed, e.g. 20 and/or 30 year annuities and mixed type of loans with 60% annuities and 40% “serial
loans”.5 At any point in time the supply of loans from the mortgage institutions has been dictated to be
“the best that the law will allow”. Danish mortgage loans have almost without exception been fixed rate
mortgage loans, owned to a large extent domestically by life insurance companies and pension funds
with a preference for long term fixed rate bonds.
One consequence of this tight regulation has been that until recently the pace of innovation in the Danish
market for mortgage loans has been very slow. As a matter of fact it has been difficult until recent
years to talk of much innovation at all arising from the credit institutions themselves and separate from
suggestions channeled through government offices, government committees and the Central Bank. In
1976 a type of adjustable rate mortgage loans was introduced, where the outstanding debt was scheduled
to be refinanced in its entirety every 5 years. These loans were funded by non-callable short term bullet
bonds and formerly issued in the period 1976-1985, where a tax reform put an obstacle to this activity.
However, they never gained more than a few percent of the market for newly issued loans.
Discussions about reintroducing an adjustable rate mortgage product took place in the financial sector
and in government committees after 1985. The tax reform obstacle was removed in 1993, but this did
not result in the introduction of new products until 1996. At this time one of the largest Danish mortgage
institutions, Realkredit Danmark A/S6, introduced a product with a gradual refinancing schedule allow-
ing for a smooth reaction and transition of debtor loan rates to movements in the levels of the market
interest rates. Simultaneously RD reintroduced the previously known adjustable rate loans, refinancing
the remaining debt 100% at fixed intervals in time.
The motivation behind these mortgage loans were
1. to allow a flexible risk profile for the debtor w.r.t. the mix of fixed rate and adjustable rate loans,
hence also w.r.t. the liquidity burden during the amortization period of the loan and
2. to allow for the funding of such loans by
(a) issuing non-callable mortgage bonds in such a way that the strict balance principle is obeyed
and
(b) at the same time use funding instruments (bullet bonds) of a type that are internationally well
known, attempting to attract more demand from foreign investors towards the Danish mortgage
bond market
5Loans with equal repayments at each payment date.
6Shortened as RD.
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3. to lower debtor loan rates by “ riding the yield curve". Under “normal market conditions”, with
a rising 0-coupon term structure, funding and refinancing a long term loan in the short end of the
market leads to lower debtor loan rates, but at the risk of rising future interest rates.
The introduction of these loans led the European Patent Office to grant a European wide patent to RD, cf.
EPO (1999). This appears to be the first case of a mortgage loan product being patented in Europe. After
numerous oppositions were made to EPO by a variety of European financial institutions, in accordance
with the procedures for granted patents7 and claiming that no patentable invention had taken place, the
patent was voluntarily given up by the proprietor RD in the spring 2001. No official explanation for this
act has been given; it was following both the first official responses from EPO to the oppositions and the
announcement of the merger between RD and Danske Bank, the latter being part of the group of financial
institutions that opposed the granted patent.
Since the introduction of these adjustable rate mortgage loans other mortgage credit institutions have
offered products with similar features, and except for the public disclosure rules for patent applications
part of the computational implementations behind these products are treated as commercial secrets. For
this reason the present paper is kept mostly in general terms, describing some general features and a
computationally simple way this general idea can be implemented. However, it should be noted that
the idea of treating essential parts of the computational procedures for such loans as commercial secrets
appears to be at odds with current consumer credit legislation within the European Union.8
This paper does not discuss models set up to describe the home owner’s choice of fixed rate loans versus
variable rate loans. Investing in a house is probably the largest and most important financial decision
made by many households, and utility based considerations of the optimal loan and security design
for home owners is a separate topic that has recently been discussed elsewhere. Some representative
examples, among others, are Campbell and Cocco (2003), Cocco (2005), Flavin and Yamashita (2002),
Nielsen and Poulsen (2002) and Stanton and Wallace (1996), all including citations of numerous earlier
contributions. The need for asset allocation models to include lifetime labour income, pension plans and
owner occupied housing is well recognized, and it is to be expected that this part of the literature will
grow and extend traditional asset allocation models. However, it is also recognized that such aspects add
considerable complexity to the traditional asset allocation models.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 the notation as well as the mathematics of the book-
keeping mechanism and balance principle is introduced. In section 3 the equations are manipulated
to show a certain recursive structure facilitating closed-form expressions for the funding pattern. The
possibility of negative entries in this funding pattern is a problem of practical significance; Theorem 1
7In addition some of the major credit institutions also filed a lawsuit in Denmark.
8Directive 87/102/EEC and later directives concerning credit for consumers spell out the basic philosophy and the general
information requirements concerning consumer credits within the European Union.
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describes conditions under which this is avoided and also some structural characteristics of the funding
patterns for certain types of standard loans. Section 4 shows numerical examples of the formulas devel-
oped in section 3. In section 5 a number of sufficient conditions are given in order for the debtor’s interest
rate on the loan to be uniquely determined. These conditions include all “normal circumstances” and the
reader can skip this section with no consequences for the understanding of the rest of the paper. Section
6 shows a general way to deal with the negative funding problem if the menu of funding instruments
renders this problem unavoidable. Some numerical examples are given in section 7. A short description
of possible ways to implement a gradual refinancing procedure is given in section 8. Proofs of theorems
are found in the Appendix.
2 Notation and the balance principle
A loan is defined by
• The principle of the debtor’s loan. Without loss of generality we only treat the case where this is
normalized to 1 at the time of contracting.
• The debtor’s profile of repayments
(
Zd1 , Z
d
2 , . . . , Z
d
n
)
, which also defines the maturity n of the loan.
• The current interest rate y on the debtor’s loan. And − in case of an adjustable rate loan − the rules
for future adjustments of y. In cases where the value of y may change we will assume that this can
only occur at payment dates. Despite the possibility of an adjustable interest rate, we will keep the
notation y when no misunderstanding is possible.
We assume that the periodic payments occur at equidistant points in time and denote these payments by
Pj , j=1, 2, . . . , n. The payment at time j includes
1. interest on the outstanding balance, equal to the sum
∑n
t=j Z
d
t of the remaining repayments Zdt , t=
j, . . . , n, and
2. the repayment Zdj .
The following identities are true at any date j as a matter of simple accounting:
Debtor’s payment : Pj =
n∑
t=j+1
yZdt + (1 + y)Z
d
j (1)
Value (normalized) : 1 =
n∑
j=1
Zdj ⇔ 1 =
n∑
j=1
Pj(1 + y)
−j (2)
The funding takes place by issuing bullet bonds of maturities 1, 2, . . . , n. These bullet bonds are designed
such that the entire payment Pj on the portfolio of outstanding bonds matches the debtor’s payment. This
is the essence of the strict balance principle: Except for transaction fees and directly charged interest rate
margins, the payments from the debtor are exactly matching the payments to the creditors (bondholders).
The notation needed is as follows:
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• The j’th funding principal is denoted by Zbj .
• The coupon rate on the j’th bond with principal Zbj is denoted by cj .
• The market price of the j’th bond per unit face value is kj .
In parallel to the debtor’s bookkeeping, cf. equations (1)-(2), there is a similar bookkeeping for the issued
bonds. The strict balance principle and the funding requirement – that the market value of the portfolio
of issued bonds must match the principal of the loan – leads to the two equations:
Bondholder’s payment : Pj =
n∑
t=j+1
ctZ
b
t + (1 + cj)Z
b
j (3)
Funding requirement : 1 =
n∑
j=1
kjZ
b
j (4)
The four relations, (1)-(4), can be written in matrix form as shown in (5)-(6). These equations constitute
2n+2 equations in 3n+1 unknowns: {Zd1 , . . . , Zdn}, {Zb1, . . . , Zbn}, {P1, . . . , Pn} and y. Given y the
equations are linear, but y enters in a non-linear way. In order to proceed it is necessary to eliminate n−1
degrees of freedom.
P1
P2
.
.
.
Pn−1
Pn
1

=

1 + y y y . . . y
0 1 + y y . . . y
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
0
.
.
.
.
.
. 1 + y y
0 0 . . . 0 1 + y
1 1 . . . 1 1

·

Zd1
Zd2
.
.
.
Zdn−1
Zdn

(5)

P1
P2
.
.
.
Pn−1
Pn
1

=

1 + c1 c2 c3 . . . cn
0 1 + c2 c3 . . . cn
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
0 0 . . . 0 1 + cn
k1 k2 . . . kn−1 kn

·

Zb1
Zb2
.
.
.
Zbn−1
Zbn

(6)
For a bullet loan as well as a serial loan the profile of repayments is given in advance. For all cases,
where this profile
{
Zd1 , Z
d
2 , . . . , Z
d
n
}
is given a priori, the bottom equation in (5) becomes redundant and
we have 2n+ 1 equations in only 2n+ 1 unknowns: {Zb1, . . . , Zbn}, {P1, . . . , Pn} and y.
For other cases the usual practice is to specify enough structure on the profile
{
Zd1 , Z
d
2 , . . . , Z
d
n
}
of
repayments in order to remove n−1 degrees of freedom. E.g. an annuity loan ties the profile of repayments
together as a geometric series: Zdj =(1+y)Zdj−1, leaving only the size of Zd1 to be determined. Provided
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the restrictions imposed lead to a unique solution, this solution must usually be found by numerical
methods.9
Remark 1 One could also eliminate the payments Pj in the equations (5)-(6). Then the whole system
could be read as n+1 equations in 2n+1 unknowns: {Zd1 , . . . , Zdn}, {Zb1, . . . , Zbn} and y. The difference
in the number of degrees of freedom compared to above is due to the fact that the system becomes
homogenous:
Zd1 Z
d
2 Z
d
3 . . . Z
d
n
1 + y y y . . . y
0 1 + y y . . . y
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
0
.
.
.
.
.
. 1 + y y
0 0 . . . 0 1 + y
1 1 . . . 1 1

=

Zb1 Z
b
2 Z
b
3 . . . Z
b
n
1 + c1 c2 c3 . . . cn
0 1 + c2 c3 . . . cn
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
0 0 . . . 0 1 + cn
k1 k2 k3 . . . kn

(7)
and some arbitrary magnitude constraint must be imposed. E.g. that
∑n
j=1 Z
d
j = 1.
These equations also cover the traditional case where the entire stream of payments from the loan are
funded by issuing one bond as a mirror image of the loan; provided that the pricing takes place in a bond
market with no arbitrage opportunities and sufficiently rich in order to determine kj uniquely. In that
case all coupon rates must be identical, i.e. cj ≡ c ∀j, and the sequence of face values Zbj tells how to
design that particular security as a mirror image of the loan.
3 The funding pattern
After the following matrix operations in (5) as well as (6):
• subtract row 2 from row 1
• subtract row 3 from row 2
• and so forth until subtracting row n from row n− 1
these matrix representations appear as equations (8)-(9).
9The question of uniqueness of the solution is addressed later on in section 5.
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
P1 − P2
P2 − P3
.
.
.
Pn−1 − Pn
Pn
1

=

1 + y −1 0 . . . 0
0 1 + y −1 . . . 0
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
0 . . . 0 1 + y −1
0 0 . . . 0 1 + y
1 1 . . . 1 1

·

Zd1
Zd2
.
.
.
Zdn−1
Zdn

(8)

P1 − P2
P2 − P3
.
.
.
Pn−1 − Pn
Pn
1

=

1 + c1 −1 0 . . . 0
0 1 + c2 −1 . . . 0
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
1 + cn−1 −1
0 0 . . . 0 1 + cn
k1 k2 . . . kn−1 kn

·

Zb1
Zb2
.
.
.
Zbn−1
Zbn

(9)
These can be further eliminated in order to solve for the funding pattern Zbj and the interest rate y and also
to state some general properties of the solution. Define recursively the variables mj for j = 1, 2, . . . , n,
setting m0 ≡ 0 for notational convenience:
m1 ≡ (k1 +m0) · (1 + c1)
−1, mj ≡ (kj +mj−1) · (1 + cj)
−1 (10)
and perform the following matrix operations on (8) as well as (9):
• subtract m1 times row 1 from the bottom row, row n+ 1
• subtract m2 times row 2 from the bottom row, row n+ 1
• and so forth until subtracting mn times row n from the bottom row
Then we are left with the equation system (13)-(14) below, where
gj = 1 +mj−1 −mj(1 + y), j = 1, 2, . . . , n (11)
Since
∑n
j=1 Z
d
j = 1 by normalization we can rewrite the bottom equation in (13) and obtain an equation
to determine the yield y on the loan, valid in all cases:
1 =
n∑
j=1
(mj · (1 + y)−mj−1)Z
d
j (12)
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
P1 − P2
P2 − P3
.
.
.
Pn−1 − Pn
Pn
1 +
∑n
j=1 (mj−1 −mj)Pj

=

1 + y −1 0 . . . 0
0 1 + y −1 . . . 0
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
1 + y −1
0 0 . . . 0 1 + y
g1 g2 . . . . . . gn

·

Zd1
Zd2
.
.
.
Zdn−1
Zdn

(13)

P1 − P2
P2 − P3
.
.
.
Pn−1 − Pn
Pn
1 +
∑n
j=1 (mj−1 −mj)Pj

=

1 + c1 −1 0 . . . 0
0 1 + c2 −1 . . . 0
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
1 + cn−1 −1
0 0 . . . 0 1 + cn
0 0 . . . 0 0

·

Zb1
Zb2
.
.
.
Zbn−1
Zbn

(14)
Observe that whenever the sequence of repayments
{
Zd1 , Z
d
2 , . . . , Z
d
n
}
is independent of y, equation (12)
is one linear equation in the unknown y. Whenever the pattern of repayment Zdj , j=1, 2, . . . , n, depends
on y a numerical solution is necessary. However, the interest rate y can always be found numerically as
the solution to one equation without involving the pattern of funding. The coefficients mj are sufficient;
and they are readily available from market data and (10).
Remark 2 The relations above are valid for all possible payment patterns that can be constructed, hence
also for zero-coupon bonds of any of the maturities 1, 2 . . . , n. With this in mind we can rewrite the last
equation in (14):
1 =
n∑
j=1
(mj −mj−1)Pj (15)
Consider a unit investment in the zero-coupon bond with maturity j. If dj denotes the price of such a
zero-coupon bond, also termed the zero-coupon discount factor for time j, such a unit investment buys a
principal of zero coupon bonds equal to the inverse 1/dj of this discount factor. Hence, (mj−mj−1)=dj .
These zero-coupon discount factors are positive numbers in a bond market void of arbitrage opportuni-
ties. In a market operating under “normal conditions” the forward rates are also positive. Hence, under
“normal conditions” the magnitudes (mj −mj−1) are decreasing with j.
For illustrative purposes only consider first the special case where all funding bonds have the same
coupon rate c and the term structure is flat at level y. Although not a realistic case it shows that the
magnitudes derived have natural interpretations. Under these circumstances the bullet bond prices are
kj =
c
y
+
(
1−
c
y
)
(1 + y)−j (16)
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and by induction it can be proved that mj is equal to the annuity factor:
mj = αj y ≡
1− (1 + y)−j
y
(17)
Hence
mj(1 + y)−mj−1 = 1, gj = 0, mj−1 −mj = −dj = −(1 + y)
−j (18)
The latter equation in (14) is then identical to the latter equation in (13), expressing the present value
requirement
1 =
n∑
j=1
Pj(1 + y)
−j
whereas equation (12) simply reproduces the normalized revenue requirement.
In the general case the magnitudes mj appear as the solution to the forward difference equation (10):
mj =
j∑
t=1
hj
ht
(1 + ct)
−1kt (19)
where the terms hj are defined by
hj ≡
j∏
t=1
(1 + ct)
−1 (20)
The funding principals are then found from the backward difference equation (14) with the solution
Zbj =
n∑
t=j
ht
hj
(1 + cj)
−1
[
(1 + y)Zdt − Z
d
t+1
]
=
n∑
t=j
ht
hj
(1 + cj)
−1 [Pt − Pt+1] (21)
Variables with an index beyond their domain of definition are defined to have the value zero.
According to the regulatory rules it is not allowed to have any of the funding principals Zbj negative. In
practice this would imply that the mortgage credit institution should issue “too many” bonds of some
maturities in order to raise funds beyond the need of the debtor. These surplus funds should then be
used to buy back bonds at the maturities, where the mathematical solution returns a negative Zbj – called
“negative funding”. Nothing in the – essentially linear – mathematics prevents this from occurring in
general, but a solution must be found in order to correct this whenever it occurs. In some cases the
problem will disappear by lowering the coupon rates, but this is not always possible.10
With this background of notation and mathematical formulation we state the first theorem.
Theorem 1 For any loan funded by issuing bullet bonds in accordance with the strict balance principle
the following is true:
1. The funding principal at the longest maturity, Zbn, is always positive.
10Tax law considerations and the asymmetric taxation of interest payments and capital gains has lead to an implicit lower
limit on the coupon rates that is used.
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2. If the payments P1, P2, . . . , Pn are non-increasing, negative funding will never occur.
3. If the repayments Zdj are increasing between all payments dates with at most the factor 1+y, negative
funding will never occur.
4. If the payments P1, P2, . . . , Pn are non-decreasing, negative funding may occur. If so, the sequence
of funding principals {Zb1, Zb2, . . . , Zbn} will have exactly one sign change.
5. For annuity loans, the funding principals satisfy
Zbj =
dn
dj
Zbn, Z
b
n =
1 + y
1 + cn
Zdn = (1 + cn)
−1α−1ny (22)
6. If the payments P1, P2, . . . , Pn−1 are non-increasing, negative funding may occur due to the last
payment Pn. If so, the sequence of funding principals {Zb1, Zb2, . . . , Zbn−1} will have exactly one sign
change.
7. For bullet loans, the funding principals {Zb1, Zb2, . . . , Zbn−1} are all of the same sign. The sign is
determined solely by the sign of y − cn.
For annuity loans with payments in accordance with a maturity m, but where the outstanding prin-
cipal is prepaid prematurely as a balloon payment at time n, n < m, all the funding principals
{Zb1, Z
b
2, . . . , Z
b
n−1} are also all of the same sign. This sign is determined by the sign of 1−cnαm−ny.
Proof
1. Zbn =
1 + y
1 + cn
Zdn.
2. This is a direct consequence of the second equality in (21).
3. This is a direct consequence of the first equality in (21).
4. This also follows from (21). If negative funding ever occurs it can only happen after sufficiently many
negative elements of the form Pt−Pt+1 in the backwards working solution (21). And once observed
all preceding funding principals must be negative as well.
5. For annuities the repayments form a geometric series: Zdt+1 = (1 + y)Zdt . Hence only the last term
in the first equality in (21) contribute. Alternatively, since all payments are equal only the last term
in the second equality of (21) contribute.
As Pn=α−1ny=(1 + y)Zdn=(1 + cn)Zbn the relation (22) follows.
6. This also follows from (21). If negative funding Zbn−1<0 occurs because of the last payment this will
continue backwards until corrected by sufficiently many positive elements of the form Pt−Pt+1. And
once observed all preceding funding principals must be positive as well.
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7. For a bullet loan, Zdn=1 and Zdn−1=Zdn−2= . . .=Z1=0. Only two terms – the last two terms – in
(21) determine the sign of the funding principals Zbn−1, Zbn−2, . . . , Zb1. We have
Zbn−1 = (1 + cn)
−1(1 + cn−1)
−1(1 + y)− (1 + cn−1)
−1 =
y − cn
(1 + cn−1)(1 + cn)
(23)
Zbj = (1 + cj)
−1Zbj+1, j = n− 2, n− 3, . . . , 1 (24)
For the annuity loan with balloon payment we have that
Zdn = α
−1
myαm+1−ny (25)
(1 + y)Zdn−1 − Z
d
n = α
−1
my
[
(1 + y)−(m+1−n) − αm+1−ny
]
= −α−1myαm−ny (26)
Zbn−1 = (1 + cn−1)
−1α−1my
[
(1 + cn)
−1(1 + y)αm+1−ny − αm−ny
]
= (1 + cn)
−1(1 + cn−1)
−1α−1my
[
1− cnαm−ny
] (27)
Zbj = (1 + cj)
−1Zbj+1, j = n− 2, n− 3, . . . , 1 (28)
4 Examples
In Tables 1 and 2 we give four examples, an annuity loan and a bullet loan under two different term
structures. Both term structures are typically rising 0-coupon term structures, and the funding instru-
ments have been chosen to have the same coupon rate. This can easily be changed. Coupon rates, yields
and borrowing rates are in % p.a. The discount factors mj−mj−1 are denoted as dj .
Examples 1−2
t coupon kj dj 0-coupon 100 · Zbj 100 · Zbj
rate yield (annuity) (bullet)
1 4,00 1,01 0,9712 2,9703 8,5784 0,6005
2 4,00 1,01 0,9338 3,4839 8,9215 0,6245
4,00 1,00 0,8883 4,0283 9,2784 0,6495
4 4,00 0,99 0,8445 4,3161 9,6495 0,6755
5 4,00 0,98 0,8024 4,5014 10,0355 0,7025
6 4,00 0,97 0,7619 4,6362 10,4369 0,7306
7 4,00 0,96 0,7230 4,7426 10,8544 0,7598
8 4,00 0,95 0,6856 4,8318 11,2886 0,7902
9 4,00 0,94 0,6496 4,9102 11,7401 0,8218
10 4,00 0,93 0,6150 4,9816 12,2097 100,8547
Borrowing rate y 4,5968 4,8889
Table 1: Funding principals with no negative funding
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Examples 3−4
t coupon kj dj 0-coupon 100 · Zbj 100 · Zbj
rate yield (annuity) (bullet)
1 6,00 1,02 0,9623 3,9216 7,2460 -0,2898
2 6,00 1,03 0,9172 4,4145 7,6808 -0,3072
3 6,00 1,04 0,8747 4,5617 8,1416 -0,3257
4 6,00 1,05 0,8347 4,6217 8,6301 -0,3452
5 6,00 1,06 0,7969 4,6464 9,1479 -0,3659
6 6,00 1,06 0,7517 4,8708 9,6968 -0,3879
7 6,00 1,06 0,7092 5,0314 10,2786 -0,4114
8 6,00 1,05 0,6596 5,3388 10,8953 -0,4358
9 6,00 1,05 0,6223 5,4120 11,5490 -0,4620
10 6,00 1,04 0,5776 5,6417 12,2420 99,5103
Borrowing rate y 5,0414 5,4809
Table 2: Funding principals with negative funding
In the first two examples, cf. Table 1, the long term bond is priced below par – hence there are no
problems with negative funding in the bullet loan, cf. theorem 1, items (1) and (7). In the other two
examples, cf. Table 2, the bonds are all priced above par, in particular the bond with the longest maturity.
The annuity loan does not cause any problems in this respect, whereas the bullet loan will have negative
funding principals at all maturities shorter than the maximal maturity 10 in accordance with item (7) of
theorem 1.
It is apparent that debtor’s interest rate y in all four examples is dominated by the 0-coupon rate in the
long end. In Table 1 the spread between the one year and the ten year 0-coupon rate is approximately 2%.
The bullet loan has an interest rate only 10 bp below the 10-year 0-coupon rate, whereas the annuity has
an interest rate 39 bp below the 10-year 0-coupon rate. In Table 2 the spread between the one year and
the ten year 0-coupon rate is 172 bp. The bullet loan has an interest rate only 16 bp below the 10-year
0-coupon rate, whereas the annuity has an interest rate 60 bp below the 10-year 0-coupon rate.
This reflects the well know fact that the interest rate on a portfolio is closely approximated by a duration-
weighted average of the individual yields.
5 Uniqueness of the interest rate y
It remains to be examined under what circumstances a unique interest rate y can be determined from the
equations (5)-(6) or, equivalently, (8)-(9).11
11As will be apparent from theorem 2 below this is not a real issue under any set of realistic assumptions. Hence, this section
can be omitted without lack of continuity.
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Since the funding principals are given in (21) the funding requirement can be directly stated − in alter-
native versions − as
1 =
n∑
j=1
kjZ
b
j
=
n∑
j=1
kj
n∑
t=j
ht
hj
(1 + cj)
−1
[
(1 + y)Zdt − Z
d
t+1
]
=
n∑
t=1
[
(1 + y)Zdt − Z
d
t+1
] t∑
j=1
kj
ht
hj
(1 + cj)
−1
=
n∑
t=1
[
(1 + y)Zdt − Z
d
t+1
]
mt (29)
=
n∑
t=1
[Pt − Pt+1]mt (30)
=
n∑
t=1
Pt [mt −mt−1] (31)
A sufficient, but not necessary, condition in order to guarantee uniqueness is that
∂
∂y
[
(1 + y)Zdt − Z
d
t+1
]
=
∂
∂y
[Pt − Pt+1] (32)
has the same sign12 over the entire domain of definition of y, i.e. (−1,∞). Since Zdn+1=Pn+1≡0 this
sign should also be the sign of ∂P dn/∂y=∂[(1 + y)Zdn]/∂y.
This condition is valid in many cases of practical significance. It is trivially the case in all scenarios where
the profile of repayments is independent of y, e.g. bullet loans and serial loans with equal repayments
of principal at every payment.13 It is also the case for annuities, where all the terms [Pt−Pt+1] are zero
except for the very last one, which is equal to the annuity payment:
Pn = (1 + y)Z
d
n = α
−1
ny
which is clearly an increasing function of y.
This observation carries over to portfolios of loans satisfying these sufficiency conditions. E.g. a mixture
of an annuity, a bullet loan and a serial loan satisfies the sufficiency condition in (32).14
As pointed out in relation to (15) the coefficients mt−mt−1 are the implicit discount factors that can be
derived from the bond market. If there are no arbitrage opportunities in the bond market these coefficients
are:
12Zeroes can be ignored.
13As noted above the interest rate y can be found under these circumstances as the solution of one linear equation in one
unknown.
14A mixture of 60% annuity and 40% serial loan were required by law in the period 1986-1993 for most Danish mortgage
loans.
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1. uniquely determined positive numbers
2. independent of the coupon rates on the underlying bullet bonds
3. under “normal assumptions”, reflecting positive forward rates, these coefficients are also decreasing
numbers in the interval (0,1)
Under the “no arbitrage” assumption it is sufficient that ∂Pt/∂y is of the same sign ∀t. If, furthermore,
there are no negative forward rates, it is sufficient that all partial sums
∑j
t=1 ∂Pt/∂y, j = 1, 2, . . . , n,
have the same sign.
Summarizing these rather general characterizations of sufficient conditions we have.
Theorem 2 In order for the interest rate y on the loan to be uniquely determined it is sufficient that one
of the following conditions are satisfied.
1. The profile of repayments Zdj , j=1, 2, . . . , n, is independent of y.
2. The derivatives
∂
∂y
[
(1 + y)Zdt − Z
d
t+1
]
=
∂
∂y
[Pt − Pt+1]
have the same sign for t=1, 2, . . . , n. Since Zn+1 = Pn+1 ≡ 0, this sign must be the same as the
sign of ∂P dn/∂y.
3. Any portfolio of loans individually satisfying either condition (1) or condition (2) with identical signs
across the individual loans in the portfolio.
4. If the bond market is arbitrage free it is sufficient that the derivatives ∂Pt/∂y have the same sign for
t=1, 2, . . . , n. This is in particular satisfied for all payment profiles of the form
Pt+1 = aPt, Pn = a
n−1P1 +
m∑
t=n+1
at−1P1(1 + y)
−(t−n) (33)
where a>0 and P1 is set in order to fulfill the present value condition.
5. If – in addition to being arbitrage free – the bond market is void of negative forward rates it is
sufficient that all partial sums∑jt=1 ∂Pt/∂y, j = 1, 2, . . . , n have the same sign.
Proof
1. If the profile of repayments Zdt is independent of y, equation (29) is one linear equation in y.
2. If this sign condition is satisfied, the rhs of (29) is a monotone function of y, because all coefficients
mt are positive.
3. Trivial.
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4. The proof of this is devoted to the Appendix.
5. The proof of this is devoted to the Appendix.
Remark 3 The payment profiles in (33) cover loans of a certain systematic type.15 For a= 1 it is an
annuity with periodic payments calculated relative to an “as if” maturity of m, but with a prescribed
balloon payment equal to the remaining debt at time n. Letting m → ∞ gives the bullet loan as the
limiting case.
The possibility of constructing payment profiles with such a degree of interaction between the interest
rate and the payment profile that problems of non-uniqueness of the interest rate y show up is a highly
theoretical one in view of theorem 2 and non-existing for any practical purpose.
6 Negative funding
The origin of negative funding is the possibility of increasing payments, cf. theorem 1, items (4)-(6).
This occurs most outspokenly for a bullet loan, but will also occur for other loans with a final payment
that changes the nature of the payment profile {P1, P2, . . . , Pn−1}.
Consider first the case of a bullet loan, where we know that all funding principals Zbj , j=1, 2, . . . , n−1,
are of the same sign. If they are all negative the following equation solves this problem by “rolling
back” the negative funding. Since an increase in a negative funding variable Zbj must necessarily be
compensated by a decrease in another funding variable there is only one way this can be accomplished
for a bullet loan: All funding must be placed at the longest maturity bond Zbn.
As will become clear below this will in itself correct the negative funding problem. However, the pay-
ment profile arising from this recalculation does not reflect a true bullet loan, although it resembles
closely the bullet loan. It has some rather small intermediate repayments and a large balloon payment at
maturity.
In order to preserve the funding requirement the changes in funding must obey the relation
n−1∑
j=1
kj(−Z
b
j ) + kn∆Z
b
n = 0 ⇒ ∆Z
b
n =
1
kn
n−1∑
j=1
kjZ
b
j (34)
Furthermore, from (13) and (14) it is apparent that the revised payment profile for the first n−1 payments
forms an annuity, just like the payments in a bullet loan. Debtor’s interest rate y, the internal rate of return
on the sequence of payments, is the yield on the single funding instrument. In an increasing 0-coupon
term structure this will lower the true interest rate below the interest rate found for the payments based
on negative funding.
15The loans described belong to the class of socalled “systematic loans” discussed at length in Hasager and Jensen (1990).
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Example 5
Consider the previous examples in Table 2. Performing the recalculation in (34) leads to the payments
in Table 3.
The true bullet loan can be re-established provided the small repayments are planned to be neutralized
by future funding, selling more of the n-maturity bond in time with the repayments to be neutralized.16
Since future market conditions cannot be known at the date of contracting this involves changes in the
interest rate y in time with every new funding issue. In the example additional funding of 0,2991 is
necessary at time 1, lowering the debtor payment from 5,7692 to 5,4701, which is the interest payment
on the principal 100. After this additional funding the rest of the planned new funding (the remaining
entries in the column “Zdj corrected”) are no longer valid unless the interest rate y remains unchanged
by coincidence. In other words it is necessary to give up either the bullet loan feature or the fixed rate
feature.
t coupon kj ∆Pj Pj Pj Zdj 100 · Zbj 100 · Zbj
rate (corrected) (original) (corrected) (corrected) (bullet)
1 6,00 1,02 0,2883 5,7692 5,4809 0,2991 0 -0,2898
2 6,00 1,03 0,2883 5,7692 5,4809 0,3155 0 -0,3072
3 6,00 1,04 0,2883 5,7692 5,4809 0,3328 0 -0,3257
4 6,00 1,05 0,2883 5,7692 5,4809 0,3510 0 -0,3452
5 6,00 1,06 0,2883 5,7692 5,4809 0,3702 0 -0,3659
6 6,00 1,06 0,2883 5,7692 5,4809 0,3904 0 -0,3879
7 6,00 1,06 0,2883 5,7692 5,4809 0,4118 0 -0,4114
8 6,00 1,05 0,2883 5,7692 5,4809 0,4343 0 -0,4358
9 6,00 1,05 0,2883 5,7692 5,4809 0,4580 0 -0,4620
10 6,00 1,04 -3,5578 101,9231 105,4809 96,6369 96,1538 99,5103
Borrowing rate 5,4701 5,4809
Table 3: Funding principals for a modified bullet loan
The suggested procedure shown in Table 3 is a feasible correction to the negative funding problem. It is
also optimal in the sense that it minimizes the total amount of additional funding. More generally, define
the supplementary funding values by the non-negative variables Z˜dj , j =1, 2, . . . , n−1. As seen above
they can be thought of as “negative repayments”, hence a supplementary funding is a reduction in the
planned repayment Zdj that would arise from a funding procedure where all the funding is issued at the
beginning for the period. Minimizing the total amount of “negative repayment” can be formulated as a
16The additional funding does not have to carry the same coupon rate as the old n-maturity bond.
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quasi-linear programming problem. In mathematical terms and for a given value of y this is written in
terms of a standard simplex tableau in (35) below.
If it is necessary to take out supplementary funding at time 1 the payments on the funding instruments
exceed the desired payments on the loan. The difference is exactly Z˜d1 , reflecting an additional loan to be
taken up and funded by funding instruments and on market terms valid at time 1. This is the coefficient
“−1” in the first row.
Interest must be paid on this additional loan at times t=2, 3, . . . , n−1. This is reflected in the coefficients
y in the column under Z˜d1 at entries t=2, 3, . . . , n−1. At time n the loan must be repaid, reflected in the
coefficient 1+y at entry n. Hence, for a given and guessed value of y the objective function is to minimize
the total amount of additional funding, subject to the constraints that in any period the payments
• on the funding portfolio
• plus the interest payments on already issued additional funding
• less the possible additional funding issued in that period
must match the planned payments. In case a non-negative funding scheme exists, the values of all the
additional funding variables Z˜dj , j=1, 2, . . . , n−1, will be driven to zero.
Minimize
∑n−1
j=1 Z˜
d
j
{Z˜dj ≥ 0, Z
b
j ≥ 0, y}
subject to
Zb1 Z
b
2 Z
b
3 . . . Z
b
n Z˜
d
1 Z˜
d
2 Z˜
d
3 . . . Z˜
d
n−1
0 0 0 . . . 0 −1 −1 −1 . . . −1
1 + c1 c2 c3 . . . cn −1 0 0 . . . 0
0 1 + c2 c3 . . . cn y −1 0 . . . 0
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
. . . .
.
.
.
0
.
.
.
.
.
. 1 + cn−1 cn y y
.
.
. −1
0 0 . . . 0 1 + cn 1 + y 1 + y 1 + y . . . 1 + y
=
Zd1 Z
d
2 Z
d
3 . . . Z
d
n
0 0 0 . . . 0
1 + y y y . . . y
0 1 + y y . . . y
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
0 . . . . . . 1 + y y
0 0 . . . . . . 1 + y
(35)
18
Only the interest rate y enters in a non-linear fashion. For a given y the optimal value of the funding
variables Zbj , j=1, 2, . . . , n can be checked to see if the funding requirement
n∑
j=1
kjZ
b
j = 1 (36)
If the solution found for Zbj falls short of the funding requirement, a marginal increase in y can be made
and the solution can be recalculated. A search procedure can be continued until the funding requirement
is matched within the required precision.
By standard row operations we can reformulate (35) as
Minimize
∑n−1
j=1 Z˜
d
j
{Z˜dj ≥ 0, Z
b
j ≥ 0, y}
subject to
Zb1 Z
b
2 Z
b
3 . . . Z
b
n Z˜
d
1 Z˜
d
2 Z˜
d
3 . . . Z˜
d
n−1
0 0 0 . . . 0 −1 −1 −1 . . . −1
1 + c1 −1 0 . . . 0 −1− y 1 0 . . . 0
0 1 + c2 −1 . . . 0 0 −1− y 1 . . . 0
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
. . . .
.
.
.
0
.
.
.
.
.
. 1 + cn−1 −1 −1 −1
.
.
. −(2 + y)
0
.
.
.
.
.
. 0 1 + cn 1 + y 1 + y 1 + y . . . 1 + y
=
Zd1 Z
d
2 Z
d
3 . . . Z
d
n
0 0 0 . . . 0
1 + y −1 0 . . . 0
0 1 + y −1 . . . 0
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
0 . . . . . . 1 + y −1
0 0 . . . . . . 1 + y
(37)
The problem can also be solved as an optimization problem in all 2n variables:
Zb1, Z
b
2, . . . , Z
b
n, Z˜
d
1 , Z˜
d
2 , . . . , Z˜
d
n−1, y
simultaneously with the constraints (36)-(37) and the non-negativity conditions. Numerous numerical
procedures exist for this type of constrained optimization.
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The same pattern repeats itself at time 2, 3, . . . , n−1. However, the existing payments from already
issued funding instruments must be taken to the r.h.s. and only the additional funding must be found.
When new funding is issued at time under market conditions unknown at time 0, a re-calculation of the
interest rate on the loan is necessary in order to equate the present value of the planned payments with
the remaining balance on the loan.
From the bottom equation of (37) it is apparent that the objective of minimizing the amount of additional
funding is equivalent to maximizing the funding variable Zbn, subject to the constraints in (37). Hence, if
a feasible solution can be found where funding only takes place by issuing the bond of longest maturity
it is also optimal.
Bullet loans and annuity loans with a balloon payment share the property that the funding can be carried
out by issuing only the longest term bond. Hence, from the upper n−2 equations in (37) the additional
funding follows a geometric series: Z˜dj+1 = (1 + y)Z˜dj . Given this, each of the upper n−2 equations
reduce to the empty statement “0=0”.
Consider first the case of a bullet loan. Solving the last two equations in (37) backwards − knowing that
Zbn=1/kn − gives the following result:
1 + cn
kn
= (1 + y)
1− n−1∑
j=1
Z˜dj
 (38)
1− n−1∑
j=1
Z˜dj
 = (1 + y)Z˜dn−1 + 1kn (39)
Theorem 3 The equations (38)-(39) have a unique solution for the interest rate y ∈ (−1,∞) and the
sequence Z˜1j , . . . , Z˜dn−1. This is also the case for an annuity loan with a balloon payment and the
corresponding equations for that case.
Proof The proof of the uniqueness is purely technical and devoted to the Appendix. Similarly, the
necessary modifications for the annuity loan with a balloon payment is found in the Appendix.
Example 5 (continued)
Consider Table 3 and the first re-funding operation that takes place at time 1. The planned payments
on the loan are 5.4701 for the first 9 periods and 105.4701 at maturity. At time 1 additional funding of
0.2991 is raised in order to meet the coupon payment 5.7692 on the issued 10-year bonds.
The optimization problem related to the additional funding at time 1 requires the market conditions at
time 1 as input. Assume for the purpose of illustration that market rates have dropped and that the market
conditions are in accordance with the data shown in Table 1. The optimal solution only involves use of
the longest bond, now with maturity 9 years, carrying 4% coupon and sold at 94% of face value and
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with the yield 4.8381%. After having performed the same row operations as those leading to (37) the
optimal solution for new funding Zb10 and new planned additional funding involves solving the equations
(40)-(42), where Z˜dt+1=(1 + y) · Z˜dt for t=2, 3, . . . , 8:
Zb10 +
8∑
t=2
Z˜dt + (2 + y) · Z˜
d
9 = 100−
100
1.04
(40)
1.04 · Zb10 + (1 + y) ·
9∑
t=2
Z˜dt = (1 + y) · 100−
106
1.04
(41)
0.94 · Zb10 = 0.2991 (42)
The solution is
Zb10 = 0.3182 Z˜
d
2 = 0.3138 y = 5.4681 (43)
The large drop in interest rates only lowers the borrowing rate from 5.4701% to 5.4681%. The need for
additional funding at time 2 has diminished marginally from 0.3155 to 0.3138.
As an example where the sole use of the longest term bond is not feasible consider the case of a serial
loan with a balloon payment. For such a loan we know from theorem 1, item (6), that the negative
funding occurs - if at all - in a sequence like j, j+1, . . . , n−1.
Example 6
We take the following input data for a four period maturity horizon and an underlying 40 period serial
loan with balloon payment at maturity 4 for granted.
t coupon kt 0-coupon yield
(% p.a.) rate
1 8 1.04 3.8462 3.8462
2 8 1.08 3.7694 3.7723
3 8 1.11 4.0523 4.0336
4 8 1.12 4.7318 4.6438
Table 4: Input data for a serial loan with negative funding
Zb1 Z
b
2 Z
b
3 Z
b
4 Z˜
d
1 Z˜
d
2 Z˜
d
3 y
32.29 -1126.53 -2378.06 896270.29 0 0 0 4.6456
9.49 0 0 892848.33 0 1150.70 2365.09 4.6438
Table 5: Funding pattern for a serial loan with negative funding
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Table 5 shows the unrestricted funding pattern with negative funding at maturities 2 and 3 − in accor-
dance with theorem 1, items (4) and (6) − together with the optimal restricted funding pattern for a loan
with principal 1.000.000.17
As can be read of from the reduced form expression of the funding equations in (37), any correction of a
funding variable, say Zbj , from negative to zero− keeping the interest rate y unchanged− induces a need
for all previous funding variables Zj−i to increase. The necessary changes in y are usually very small,
so this property is expected to show up in the end result. This is also as shown in the example above,
where Zb3 is set at zero, Zb2 is increased to a positive level and Zb1 is increased above the level found in
the unrestricted solution. The effect on y, however, is only 24 bp.
Example 7
Analogous to example 6 we take the following input data for a four period maturity horizon and an
underlying 40 period annuity loan with balloon payment at maturity 4:
t coupon kt 0-coupon yield
(% p.a.) rate
1 6 1.04 1.9231 1.9231
2 6 1.07 2.3879 2.3752
3 6 1.10 2.5145 2.4987
4 6 1.12 2.8255 2.7880
Table 6: Input data for an annuity loan with negative funding
Table 7 shows the unrestricted funding pattern with negative funding at all maturities except the longest
one − in accordance with theorem 1, item (7) − together with the optimal restricted funding pattern for
a loan with principal 1.000.000:
Zb1 Z
b
2 Z
b
3 Z
b
4 Z˜
d
1 Z˜
d
2 Z˜
d
3 y
-11622.14 -12319.47 -13058.64 928244.07 0 0 0 2.7967
0 0 0 892857.14 11778.93 12107.33 12444.89 2.7880
Table 7: Funding pattern for an annuity loan with negative funding
17The calculations have been performed in MATLAB with a very high degree of precision. Rounding off the interest rate to
4 decimals as reported in Table 5 is an insufficient degree of precision to redo the amortization; in practice these calculations
are performed with 8 decimals precision by the mortgage credit institutions.
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7 Fully refinanced mortgage loans
A fully refinanced mortgage loan is a mortgage loan, where the payment schedule is set on an “as if”
basis. I.e. the payments are calculated as if the loan was to be amortized over a certain time horizon m
according to some fixed schedule. It is agreed that the remaining debt is subject to refinancing every n
years. A 30 year loan may be refinanced fully every 2,3,5,6,10 or 15 years with all adjustment periods of
equal length. However, re-financing may occur every 4 years. In that case at least one of the adjustment
periods must be different from 4 years.18
The objective embodied in such a mortgage loan is two-fold. One objective is to have a degree of
adjustability in the long term mortgage rate instead of basing the conditions for maybe a 30 year mortgage
upon specific market conditions at a particular date. Another objective is, of course, that the debtor under
conditions of rising term structures can “ride the yield curve” by funding a long term borrowing need in
the short end of the bond market. This involves, of course, the risk of future rising yield curves.
A compromise between these two objectives involves a choice on behalf of the debtor. The highest
degree of “yield curve riding” is the “F1-loan”, where the entire outstanding debt is refinanced every
year by issuing new bonds with one year to maturity. This will ensure the debtor the lowest payments in
the short run, but it will also give the highest degree of variability in the debtor’s payments in the long
run.
We can illustrate the procedure by using the input data from our previous examples, cf. Table 1 and Table
2.
t coupon kj hj mj dj 0-coupon 100 · Zbj 100 · Zbj
rate rate (annuity) (bullet)
1 4,00 1,01 0,9615 0,9712 0,9712 2,9703 8,4832 0,3702
2 4,00 1,01 0,9246 1,9050 0,9338 3,4839 8,8226 0,3850
3 4,00 1,00 0,8890 2,7932 0,8883 4,0283 9,1755 0,4004
4 4,00 0,99 0,8548 3,6377 0,8445 4,3161 9,5425 0,4165
5 4,00 0,98 0,8219 4,4401 0,8024 4,5014 65,2027 100,4331
Borrowing rate 4,3297 4,4504
Table 8: Funding principals with no negative funding. m=10, n=5.
t coupon kj hj mj dj 0-coupon 100 · Zbj 100 · Zbj
rate rate (annuity) (bullet)
1 4,00 1,01 0,9615 0,9712 0,9712 2,9703 8,0347 -0,4853
2 4,00 1,01 0,9246 1,9050 0,9338 3,4839 90,9752 99,4952
Borrowing rate 3,4521 3,4751
18These loans are termed “F-loan”, and with re-financing every n years the loans are characterized as “Fn-loans”.
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Table 9: Funding principals with negative funding. m=10, n=2.
t coupon kj hj mj dj 0-coupon 100 · Zbj 100 · Zbj
rate rate (annuity) (bullet)
1 6,00 1,02 0,9434 0,9623 0,9623 3,9216 6.9971 -1.0223
2 6,00 1,03 0,8900 1,8795 0,9172 4,4145 7.4170 -1.0836
3 6,00 1,04 0,8396 2,7542 0,8747 4,5617 7.8620 -1.1487
4 6,00 1,05 0,7921 3,5889 0,8347 4,6217 8.3337 -1.2176
5 6,00 1,06 0,7473 4,3858 0,7969 4,6464 64.4308 98.7094
Borrowing rate 4,5991 4,6319
Table 10: Funding principals with negative funding. m=10, n=5
t coupon kj hj mj dj 0-coupon 100 · Zbj 100 · Zbj
rate rate (annuity) (bullet)
1 6,00 1,02 0,9434 0,9623 0,9623 3,9216 7,1181 -1,4206
2 6,00 1,03 0,8900 1,8795 0,9172 4,4145 90,0384 98,4942
Borrowing rate 4,0781 4,4038
Table 11: Funding principals with negative funding. m=10, n=2
8 Partially refinanced loans
Instead of loans where the outstanding debt is scheduled for a full refinancing at predetermined points
in time the idea of a gradual refinancing has also been introduced. Behind this idea is, of course, again
the attempt to “ride the yield curve” in the sense that a long term borrowing need is funded sequentially
by bonds with much shorter maturity and – under “normal” conditions in the bond market – with lower
yields. The change in the debtor’s interest rate is smoothed out relative to the fully refinanced type of
mortgage loan.
The description is not as detailed as for the fully refinanced loans. First, the actual market development
seems to have concentrated almost exclusively on the fully refinanced type of loans, and the gradually
refinanced type of loans is not offered by all the mortgage credit institutions. Second, among those that
do the actual implementation appears to be treated with some degree of confidentiality. Hence, we are
limited to a general description of possible solutions. In consideration of limitations as to a reasonable
length of this paper we only describe possible ways for the initial funding problem and do not discuss
lengthy details of possible implementations of the calculations for future refunding.
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Assume that it has been agreed to refinance the fraction 1/n of the outstanding debt every year. This is
carried out by issuing bonds with maturities 1, 2, . . . , n and is known as a “P 100/n loan´´. In the first
place this looks like a prepayment of 1/n of the loan, because it is irrelevant for the funding pattern
whether the refinancing actually takes place or whether the fraction 1/n is simply prepaid. However,
care must be taken in designing the funding profile, because the refinancing is a recurrent event. Too
much funding in the “long end” prevents the planned prepayment/refinancing from taking place in the
future − there are too few bonds maturing. Too much funding in the “short end” forces the actual
prepayment/refinancing to be higher than planned − there are too many bonds maturing. The problem
then is to construct a funding pattern, where
• there is an adequate amount of bonds of the shortest maturity outstanding to match the prepay-
ment/refinancing
• there is an adequate amount of bonds with maturities 2, 3, . . . outstanding so that the planned future
prepayment/refinancing can take place without incurring negative funding problems
This cannot be guaranteed under all circumstances. The refinancing conditions in the market may de-
velop in such a way that the planned future refinancing cannot be carried out. This will occur whenever
there are already too many bonds of the nearest maturity outstanding in a refinancing situation. However,
there are ways to do this in a manner that achieves this goal under relatively “smooth” market movements
and comes very close to also under more volatile market movements.
An easy procedure for implementing a gradual refinancing scheme would be to build, say, a P33 loan as
three F-loans with an obvious initialization procedure. This is easily implemented and easily calculated,
although there will be some negligeable deviations from the planned refinancing schedule with 1/3 at
each payment date. Given the simplicity this would have been a very simple solution. However, this has
to our knowledge not been implemented by any of the credit institutions.
The original repayment profile {Zd1 , Zd2 , . . . , Zdm} is an element of the unit simplex ∆m in IRm:
∆
m ≡ {x ∈ IRm |
m∑
j=1
xj = 1, xj ≥ 0, j = 1, 2, . . . ,m}
One way is to calculate as if the loan is being repaid in its entirety within a given horizon, tacitly un-
derstood to be equal to n. Technically, the repayment profile from the corresponding non-adjustable rate
loan is mapped onto the subsimplex ∆n. Having done so, the previous calculations can be invoked to
find the funding profile for the initial period.
There are infinitely many possibilities to construct this mapping onto ∆n. We briefly mention two
such candidates. We also briefly describe the essence of the algorithm for partially refinanced loans in
EPO (1999), although it does not fall into this characterization.
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One candidate, cf. (44), maintains the P 100/n-loan as a P 100/n-loan, but prepays the entire outstanding
debt extraordinarily at time n. This way of calculating the funding profile will match the first prepayment,
and it will have a tendency to push the funding principals towards the longer end.
Zd1
Zd2
.
.
.
.
.
.
Zdm−1
Zdm

→

Zd1 + (1/n)(
∑m
t=2 Z
d
t )
((n− 1)/n))
(
Zd2 + (1/n)
∑m
t=3 Z
d
t
)
.
.
.
((n− 1)/n))n−2
(
Zdn−1 + (1/n)
∑m
t=n Z
d
t
)
((n− 1)/n)n−1
(∑m
t=n Z
d
t
)

(44)
Each of the original repayments Zdp , p=2, . . . , n, is repaid in accordance with the schedule:(
1
n
,
1
n
n− 1
n
,
1
n
(
n− 1
n
)2
, . . . ,
1
n
(
n− 1
n
)p−2
,
(
n− 1
n
)p−1)
(45)
whereas the repayments Zdp , p=n+ 1, n+ 2, . . . ,m is repaid in accordance with the schedule valid for
Zdn. It is straightforward to verify that
1
n
p−1∑
j=0
(
n− 1
n
)j
+
(
n− 1
n
)p
= 1 (46)
Another candidate, cf. (47), prepays exactly 1/n of outstanding debt in the beginning of each planning
period of length n. In comparison with (44) it will push the funding principals towards the shorter end:
Zd1
Zd2
.
.
.
.
.
.
Zdm−1
Zdm

→

Zd1 + (1/n)(
∑m
t=2 Z
d
t )
((n− 1)/n)
(
Zd2 + (1/n− 1))
∑m
t=3 Z
d
t
)
.
.
.
(2/n)
(
Zdn−1 + (1/2)(
∑m
t=n Z
d
t )
)
(1/n)
∑m
t=n Z
d
t )

(47)
Each of the original repayments Zdp , p=2, . . . , n, is repaid in accordance with the schedule:(
1
n
,
1
n
, . . . ,
1
n
,
n+ 1− p
n
)
(48)
whereas the repayments Zdp , p=n+ 1, n+ 2, . . . ,m is repaid in accordance with the schedule valid for
Zdn.
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The class of fully refinanced mortgage loans also falls into this category. The mapping is simple for these
loans: 
Zd1
Zd2
.
.
.
.
.
.
Zdm−1
Zdm

→

Zd1
Zd2
.
.
.
Zdn−1∑m
t=n Z
d
t

(49)
Finally, we
A third candidate is found in EPO (1999). The idea can be described by the following steps.
Consider the actual sequence of repayments Zdt , which may well depend on the interest rate on the loan
y, and assume that we do not take up any new funding, but continue to repay 1/n of the outstanding
debt every year. Then the procedure fits a polynomial Γ(t) of degree n− 1 to describe the profile of the
outstanding debt to be refinanced over the first n years:
Γ(t) = a0 + a1t+ a2t
2 + . . .+ an−1t
n−1 (50)
given that no new funding is issued. This is along the line of reasoning described in (44).
The coefficients ap are uniquely determined by solving the system of equations:
1 0 0 . . . 0
1 1 1 . . . 1
1 2 4 . . . 2n−1
1 3 9 . . . 3n−1
. . . . . . . . .
.
.
. . . .
1 n− 1 (n− 1)2 . . . (n− 1)n−1

·

a0
a1
a2
.
.
.
an−1

=

1
n
1− Zd1
n
.
.
.
1−
n−1∑
t=1
Zdt
n

(51)
Having found this polynomium the procedure uses the same polynomial to desribe the profile of funding
instruments Zbt . However, in order to make room for interest payments the procedure perturbs this poly-
nomial by allowing for a change in the two coefficients of lowest order, i.e. a0 and a1. This introduces
two new parameters γ0 and γ1. The interest rate y is the third variable to be determined.
The funding requirement is described by one equation with the two unknowns γ0 and γ1:
n∑
j=1
kjZ
b
j = 1 ⇔ (52)
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n∑
j=1
kj
γ0a0 + γ1(j − 1) + n−1∑
p=2
ap(j − 1)
b
 = 1 ⇔ (53)
γ0a0
 n∑
j=1
kj
+ γ1a1
 n∑
j=2
kj(j − 1)
 = 1− n−1∑
p=2
ap
n∑
j=2
kj(j − 1)
b (54)
The strict balance principle for the first year gives another equation with the two unknowns γ0 and γ1:
n∑
j=1
cj
γ0a0 + γ1a1(j − 1) + n−1∑
p=2
ap(j − 1)
b
+ a0 = 1 ⇔ (55)
γ0a0
1 + n∑
j=1
cj
+ γ0a1
 n∑
j=2
cj(j − 1)
 = 1− n−1∑
p=2
ap
n∑
j=2
cj(j − 1)
b (56)
The last equation is needed to determine the interest rate y as the discount rate that makes the sum of
discounted payments equal to the unity. We rewrite this condition using Makeham’s formula:
n∑
j=1
Pj(1 + y)
−j = 1 ⇔ (57)
n∑
j=1
γ0a0 + γ1a1(j − 1) + n−1∑
p=2
ap(j − 1)
b
[cj
y
+ (1 + y)−j
(
1−
cj
y
)]
= 1 (58)
These three equations are simultaneous equations that can be solved by a variety of numerical methods.
By construction the method does not produce negative funding. In EPO (1999) the procedure for recur-
rent refinancing follows the method described here, but it is important at every refunding to take care of
the existing “old funding”.
9 Appendix
Proof of theorem 2, items (4) and (5)
4. Since a>0 the sign condition in (2) of theorem 2 is satisfied for t=1, 2, . . . , n− 1. Although these
payment profiles are portfolios of a bullet loan and a loan with payments at−1P1 the portfolio weight
depends on y. Hence the former portfolio argument is no longer valid.
The present value relation fixes the choice of P1 to be determined in such a way that
1 = P1
m∑
t=1
at−1(1 + y)−t = P1
1
a
α
m ( 1+y
a
−1) = P1
1−
(
1+y
a
)
−m
1 + y − a
⇒
P1 =
1 + y − a
1−
(
1+y
a
)
−m
≡
1 + y − a
1− φ−m
, φ ≡
1 + y
a
(59)
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Hence the funding equation (31) becomes
1 =
[
1 + y − a
1− φ−m
] n∑
t=1
at−1(mt −mt−1) +
[
1− φ−(m−n)
1− φ−m
]
an(mn −mn−1) (60)
The payment P1 is always increasing in y, independent of the positive parameter a. It is a times the
annuity payment calculated with an interest rate φ− 1. Hence the first term in (60) is increasing with
y.
The second term in (60) is affected by the outstanding debt after n periods in a hypothetical annuity
with m periods maturity. This outstanding debt is also increasing with y. Differentiating after y leads
to
1
a
(m− n)φ−(m−n+1) [1− φ−m]−
[
1− φ−(m−n)
]
mφ−m−1
(1− φ−m)2
(61)
Obviously the sign is determined by the numerator alone. After cancellation of identical terms and
the elimination of common positive factors the sign is determined by(
1−
n
m
) [
1− φ−m
]
−
[
φ−n − φ−m
]
=
n
m
φ−m +
[
1−
n
m
]
φ−0 − φ−n
Because of the convexity of the function x→φ−x this expression is positive due to the subgradient
inequality.
5. Since the coefficients in (31) are positive and decreasing, the condition guarantees monotonicity w.r.t.
y. We only prove this for the case where a possible sign change in the sequence ∂P1/∂y, . . . , ∂Pn/∂y
occurs only once19 at n′. The first partial derivatives up to n′ are non-negative and the last ones are
non-positive by assumption.
The absence of negative forward rates is equivalent to the sequence of positive discount factors
m1,m2 −m1, . . . ,mn −mn−1 being decreasing. Hence we can evaluate the partial derivative:
∂
∑n
t=1 Pt[mt −mt−1]
∂y
=
n∑
t=1
∂Pt
∂y
[mt −mt−1]
=
n′∑
t=1
∂Pt
∂y
[mt −mt−1] +
n∑
t=n′+1
∂Pt
∂y
[mt −mt−1]
≥ [mn′+1 −mn′ ]
n∑
t=1
∂Pt
∂y
≥ 0 (62)
Proof of theorem 3
19The general case can be proven in an entirely analogous way, but with considerable more notation.
29
1 + cn
kn
= (1 + y)
1− n−1∑
j=1
Z˜dj
 (63)
1
kn
+ (1 + y)Z˜dn−1 =
1− n−1∑
j=1
Z˜dj
 (64)
Substitute from (63) into (64) to obtain
Z˜dn−1 =
1 + cn
kn
(1 + y)−2 −
1
kn
(1 + y)−1 (65)
From (63) we can obtain an expression for Z˜dn−1 in terms of y. Since the supplementary funding variables
form a geometric series with factor (1 + y), (63) can be formulated as
1 + cn
kn
= (1 + y)
1− Z˜dn−1 n−2∑
j=0
(1 + y)−j
 (66)
Upon substitution this results in:
1−
cn
kn
n−1∑
j=1
(1 + y)−j −
1 + cn
kn
(1 + y)−n = 0
This polynomial has exactly one positive roots for (1 + y) according to Descartes’ rule of signs.
For annuity loans with a balloon the argument is almost identical. The three equations to be examined
are:
Zbn =
1
kn
(67)
1 + cn
kn
= (1 + y)
1 + n−1∑
j=1
(Z˜dj − Z
d
j )
 (68)
1
kn
= (1 + y)(Z˜dn−1 − Z
d
n−1) +
1 + n−1∑
j=1
(Z˜dj − Z
d
j )
 (69)
Since Zdj as well as Z˜dj follow geometric series with factor 1+y the argument is exactly the same as for
the bullet loan.
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